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Abstract
Sales are a widespread and well-known phenomenon documented in several product markets.
This paper presents a novel rationale for sales that does not rely on consumer heterogeneity, or
on any form of randomness to explain such periodic price uctuations. The analysis is carried
out in the context of a simple repeated price competition model, and establishes that rms
must periodically reduce prices in order to sustain collusion when goods are storable and the
market is large. The largest equilibrium prots are characterized at any market size. A trade-o¤
between the size of the industry and its prots arises. Sales foster collusion, by magnifying the
intertemporal links in consumersdecisions.
Keywords: Storage, sales, collusion, cartel size, repeated games.
JEL classication: L11, L12, L13, L41.
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1 Introduction
The occurrence of periodic price reductions, or sales, is a pervasive and well-known microeconomic
phenomenon that has been documented in several product markets. Typically, a high price is charged
in most periods, but occasionally the price is cut to supply more units to a potentially larger group of
consumers. Product markets in which this phenomenon is prominent are, for instance, brand name
paper towels, soft drinks, or canned goods. The regular occurrence of such circumstances suggests
that sales cannot be entirely explained by random variations in supply, demand, or the aggregate
price level. Moreover, certain sale periods are traditional and so well publicized that it is di¢ cult
to justify them as devices to separate informed from uninformed consumers. A growing empirical
literature also, documents that the majority of periodic sales take place for products that are fairly
storable, and that heterogeneity in storage capacity explains part of the responsiveness of consumers
to changes in prices (Bell and Hilber 2006, Hendel and Nevo 2006 & 2010, Erdem et al 2003, Seiler
2010). Such evidence highlights the primary role that storage capacity may play in determining
consumerspurchasing behavior and thus, retailerspricing decisions.
Our analysis shows why sales can foster collusion in markets in which goods are storable, and
provides a novel motive for rms to engage in sales. While factors such as informational di¤erences
and heterogeneity in willingness to search or pay have received notable attention, the theoretical
literature on storage constraints remains scarce despite empirical relevance documented by a growing
literature. Notable exceptions are Salop and Stiglitz 1982, Hong, McAfee and Nayyar, 2002, and
Hendel, Lizzeri and Roketskiy 2012.
We consider an industry in which in every period, n rms produce a homogeneous storable good,
and sell it to a mass of consumers with unit demand in every period. We restrict attention to
economies in which at least a fraction of consumers (but possibly all consumers) have access to a
xed storage capacity S. In this context, we examine the e¤ects of storage on rms incentives
to hold periodic sales to support a greater degree of cooperation in a repeated price competition
setting. Sale strategies are characterized by a regular price, by a price mark-down (on the regular
price), and by the frequency of sales. We show that periodic sales strategies (sustained by grim
trigger punishments) allow rms to collude on signicant prot levels, even when the number of
competitors is so large to prevent collusion on any strategy without sales. Sales can strengthen
collusion, as storage intertemporally links consumer demand and thus, reduces the short-run gains
from a deviation. In any equilibrium with sales, rms will charge in any period of sales a big enough
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discount to induce all consumers with open storage capacity to stockpile a quantity su¢ cient to
satisfy all their demand until the next period of sales. Such behavior however, can reduce incentives
to deviate: both in regular price periods, as only consumers without units already stored would
purchase units from a deviant rm; and in periods with sales both because a lower price is charged
in such periods, and because consumers with storage would reduce their demand if a deviation were
observed in the wake of the imminent price war (implied by the grim trigger punishments).
The analysis begins by identifying consumer demand for the proposed environment, and by
characterizing the set of sales strategies which can be used to collude when market size is too large
to sustain collusion on any strategy without sales. Results for environments in which all consumers
have access to storage, then establish that sales strategies are prot maximizing for the industry, and
characterize the most protable equilibrium strategy for any given number of competitors. A trade-
o¤emerges between industry prots and industry size (which we often refer to as stability). When the
number of competitors is small, the monopoly prot can be sustained in classical trigger strategies.
However, as the market grows large, no strategy without sales remains incentive compatible, and
the largest equilibrium prot is pinned down by a strategy with sales. The trade-o¤ between cartel
prots and cartel size is explicitly characterized. Less frequent sales reduce aggregate prots (since a
larger discounts must be o¤ered to induce more storage), but increase the incentives to comply with
equilibrium pricing (since deviations attract a smaller fraction of the equilibrium demand). Most
conclusions extend to environments with heterogeneous consumers. The analysis characterizes the
largest number of competitors that can collude on positive prots, and shows that sales are necessary
to collude when the number of competitors is large. Access to multi-unit storage technologies is shown
to mitigate, but not eliminate the prot-size trade-o¤. For economies with unit storage, the trade-
o¤ between cartel prots and cartel size can again be explicitly characterized. Comparative statics
establish how the trade-o¤ is a¤ected by changes in the environment.
Although the results are presented in the context of a model with fully rational consumers and
possibly heterogeneous storage technologies, alternative interpretations are possible. In particular,
the results developed here would also apply to a model in which: some consumers never expect prices
to rise sharply (and thus purchase a single unit in every period); while the remaining consumers un-
derstand price dynamics in the market and purchase the optimal number of units given the expected
future price path. In this reading of the model, myopic buyers may be seen as consumers whose
the opportunity cost of investing time in understanding future prices is high. This interpretation
would be better suited to match evidence suggesting that high income households are less responsive
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to sales (Gri¢ th, Leibtag, Leicester and Nevo 2009, and Gauri, Sudhir and Talukdar 2009). The
optimal behavior of rational buyers in our model implies that consumers would curtail their demand
if an unexpected price cut were to take place in a period of sales, as prices would remain low in the
future (due to the retaliatory nature of the trigger punishments). Results however, are robust to
numerous alternative specications which relax the rationality of consumer behavior. The last part
of the analysis shows that the prot-size trade-o¤ persists even in economies in which consumers ex-
pect pricing to revert to the equilibrium path after any number of deviations. In these environments
sales can still benet collusion, as deviations from strategies without sales might induce consumers
to purchase multiple units if prices are expected to remain high in the future.
Within the proposed framework collusion will always be strengthened at the expense of aggregate
prots, since prots always decline with sales when consumers are homogeneous in their willingness
to pay. If however, consumers with higher storage capacity had a lower willingness to pay, a sale
strategy might achieve higher prots than any no-sale strategy (by price discriminating di¤erent types
of consumers), and thus foster collusion even further. We elected to keep valuations homogeneous
across consumers in order to display more transparently the e¤ects of the intertemporal link in
consumer demand.
Literature Review: One of the rst theoretical explanations for sales relates consumer search
behavior to price discrimination. Two prominent examples in this literature are Varian 1980 and
Salop and Stiglitz 1982. Varian 1980 argues that, with heterogeneously informed consumers, retail
price variations can arise as a natural outcome of mixed strategy equilibrium in which rms price
discriminate consumers with di¤erent information. Salop and Stiglitz 1982 instead, considers a model
with search costs in which consumers are imperfectly informed about the prices charged by stores and
di¤er in their ability to stockpile. In such framework the authors show that stores have incentives to
hold unannounced sales to induce consumers to purchase future consumption. Both models however,
are essentially static models and cannot account for correlation in prices. Even though the random
sales feature remains a compelling explanation for some erratic price behavior, it appears less suited
to account for many of the documented retail markdowns that are predictable, publicly known, and
take place in most stores simultaneously (Pesendofer 2002 and Warner and Barsky 1995).
The appealing fashion/clearance paradigm for sales (Lazear 1986, Pashigian 1988, and Pashigian
and Bowen 1991) can also, hardly be applied to a wide variety of retail items for which the fashion
hypothesis appears a priori less appropriate (either because the items are homogeneous, or because
styles change little over time).
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A nal relevant literature has motivated sales as a form of intertemporal price discrimina-
tion (Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel 1984, Hendel and Nevo 2010, Hong, McAfee and Nayyar 2002,
Narasimhan and Jeuland 1985, Sobel 1984). Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel 1984, and in particular
Sobel 1984 study the incentives to hold cyclical simultaneous sales as a means of price discrimination
in a durable-good environment. In most periods, prices are kept high to extract surplus from high
value consumers, but periodically prices are decreased in order to sell to a larger group of consumers
with lower reservation values. A key assumption to generate such price cycles is the constant inow
of new heterogeneous consumers in the market. Hendel and Nevo 2010, Hong, McAfee and Nayyar
2002, Narasimhan and Jeuland 1985, study the incentives to hold periodic sales in a market with
storable goods and heterogeneous consumers. In this setup, the incentives to price discriminate con-
sumers over time with sales are fully explained by the positive correlation between storage costs and
consumerswillingness to pay. We complement these papers by o¤ering a novel rationale for the
existence of sale in a dynamic storable goods model in which the incentives to hold periodic sales
arise even in the absence of any form of consumer heterogeneity. Moreover, as in Sobel 1984, we
characterize the optimal timing for sales.
Other related studies on dynamic pricing in storable goods markets di¤er signicantly from ours
both in their aims (Anton and Das Varma 2005, Ariga, Matsui and Watanabe 2010, Su 2010). For
instance, Anton and Das Varma 2005 studies the quantity competition in a two period model with
storable goods. The authors show that when consumers are su¢ ciently patient (and thus storage
costs are low), rms have a strong short-term incentive to capture future market shares from their
rivals. As a result, equilibrium prices increase in the second period (p1 = p2) and there is rational
in-advance purchase by buyers with perfect foresight. The two-period model raises the important
issue of long-run market dynamics: rising prices cannot continue indenitely. Thus, equilibrium
price and associated storage (inventory) cycles become an important possibility which we analyze
in the current framework. Both frameworks entail dynamic ine¢ ciencies, as production costs are
incurred prior to consumption for every unit stored. Our study is also, related to Hendel, Lizzeri
and Roketskiy 2012, which analyzes the non-linear pricing problem of a monopolist facing a large
number of consumers with access to storage. Within this context, the authors show that consumers
may store units to limit the monopolists surplus extraction ability, and that periodic sales may raise
the monopoly prots by limiting the intertemporal arbitrage opportunities of consumers.
The spirit of the paper is similar to other studies that have analyzed the relationship between
intertemporal linking in decisions and collusive behavior (Ausubel and Deneckere 1987, Dana and
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Fong 2010, Gul 1987, Schiraldi and Nava 2012). These studies di¤er signicantly in their goals and
setups. However, all of them exploit some intertemporal link in decisions to enhance the incentives
to collude. Ausubel and Deneckere 1987 and Gul 1987 develop oligopoly models of durable goods
pricing, and show that the Coase conjecture (Coase 1972) fails whenever multiple rms operate in
the market, since rmsability to collude improves. Within this durable good framework, Nava and
Schiraldi 2011 compares the ability to collude with and without secondary markets, and shows how
a second-hand market may further expand the ability to collude. Dana and Fong 2010 argues that
intertemporal bundling along with staggered long-term contracts may facilitate collusion. One of
the key novelties in the analysis developed here is that the intertemporal link in decisions emerges
endogenously as a consequence the pricing strategies of rms. In particular, sales induce consumers
to store thereby creating demand cycles, and consequently the link in consumer demand which
may be exploited to enhance the incentives to collude. Rotemberg and Saloner 1986 study a similar
phenomenon, but in a model with exogenous demand cycles and without storage. Our analysis shows
that when storage is possible such demand cycle might arise endogenously as a result of strategic
pricing along the equilibrium path.
Roadmap: Section 2 introduces the model, denes the relevant class of sale strategies, and presents
several preliminary results comparing di¤erent sale strategies in terms of industry prots and industry
size. Section 3 restricts attention to economies in which all consumers are homogeneous. The main
results of the section establish when sales strategies are prot maximizing for the industry, and
characterize the prot-size trade-o¤ that di¤erent strategies entail. Section 4 extends the baseline
model and results by allowing consumer heterogeneity. The maximal industry prots are determined
for any market size. The relationship between frequency and depth of sales, and market size is
discussed. Comparative static results show how the trade-o¤ is a¤ected by changes in patience, in
protability and in the fraction of consumers with access to storage. Section 5 departs from the
previous analysis by assuming that buyersbeliefs about future prices are not a¤ected by deviations.
The analysis shows that the prot-size trade-o¤ is resilient to such a change in beliefs. Section 6
presents an alternative interpretation of the model, discusses the robustness of the results developed,
and ties behavior in the model to empirical evidence on promotions. All proofs are relegated to
appendix. The web-appendix contains some derivations, and a few additional results omitted from
the main text for sake of clarity.
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2 A Model with Storable Goods
This section introduces a simple economy with storage, denes the class of sale strategies that will
be analyzed throughout the paper, and develops several preliminary results.
A Simple Economy with Storage
Consider an innite-horizon discrete-time model with innitely lived producers and consumers. Sup-
pose that two goods are traded in the model which we shall refer to as consumption q and money m.
In each period, all consumers are endowed with a large amount of money and with no consumption.
The preferences of a consumer purchasing q units of consumption in exchange of m units of money
are determined by the map,
u(q;m) =
8<: v  m if q  1 m if q < 1 .
Hence, the marginal value of consumption is v for the rst unit consumed and 0 for any additional
unit consumed. All consumers discount the future at a common factor , and the present-discounted
value of a sequence of utilities futg1t=0 is thus proportional to
(1  )
X1
t=0
tut.
There is a unit measure of consumers. Consumers di¤er only in their ability to store the consumption
good. In particular, assume that a fraction 0 of the consumers is unable to store goods, while a
fraction S can store up to S additional units of consumption. Such units do not depreciate, when
stored and can be consumed in any future period. The analysis also, applies to economies in which
all consumers are homogeneous, as the fraction of consumers with storage is allowed to take any
value in the interval [0; 1].
A nite set of rms, N with cardinality n, supplies consumption good to this market. All rms
have a common constant marginal cost of producing consumption good, c. For any vector of prices
p = (p1; :::; pn) set by the n rms on the units of consumption sold, let d(p) denote the aggregate
demand at such prices, and let n(p) denote the number of players posting the minimal price,
n(p) = jarg minj2N pjj .
As customary, the aggregate demand is split equally among rms quoting the lowest price. Thus,
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the individual demand faced by rm i satises
di(p) =
8<: d(p)=n(p) if pi = minj2N pj0 if pi > minj2N pj .
The stage game prots of rm i 2 N given any price vector p satises
i(p) = (pi   c)di(p).
All rms discount the future at a common factor . The present-discounted value of a sequence of
prots fitg1t=0 is for any rm i proportional to
(1  )
X1
t=0
tit.
Sale Strategies and Equilibrium
Firms and consumers observe all the prices quoted in the market in any previous period. Denote byH
the set of possible price histories in the game.1 A rms strategy maps histories into a price quoted
at a given date. Consumers use information about past quoted prices and about the equilibrium
strategies to form beliefs about future prices in the economy. Since consumers are small, we assume
that their decisions cannot be observed by any other individual. Consumers will thus, choose how
many units to purchase from the rms quoting the lowest price in order to maximize their individual
payo¤. For any sequence of future prices pt = fpzg1z=t, let pz = mini2N fpizg denote the market
price in period z, and let T (pt) denote the number of periods that an individual has to wait before
discounted future market price falls below the current price. That is,
T (pt) = min z subject to pt > 
zpt+z.
If there were no storage constraints, T (pt) would implicitly determine how many units would be
purchased by an individual with no units stored. This would be the case, since consumers with
access to storage would purchase multiple units only when they perceive the storage cost (1  )c to
be smaller than the cost of future price increases.2 In general however, individual demand would never
1Formally, the set of possible histories in the induced game satises H = f;g [ f[1t=1
ts=1Rn+g.
2The storage cost coincides (1  ) c, as the rate of time preferences represents the opportunity cost of spending
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exceed S + 1 units, as only S units can be stored. The next remark formalizes these observations,
and derives the demand of every consumer when faced with a future price stream pt. Denote the
individual demand of a consumer respectively with and without access to storage by dS and d0.
Remark 1 If pz  v in any period z, the individual demand for consumption good at time t:
(1) by consumers without storage technology satises d0(pt) = 1;
(2) by consumers with storage technology and with s units already in storage satises
dS(s;p
t) = max

min

T (pt); S + 1
	  s; 0	 .
The remark immediately implies that all consumers of the same type purchase the same number of
units in every period. Hence, aggregate demand in a period in which all consumers with access to
storage have the same number of units s satises
d(s;pt) = 0 + SdS(s;p
t).
The equilibrium strategies that analyzed throughout the paper discipline deviations as trigger strate-
gies would. However, equilibrium prices vary along the equilibrium path. In particular, strategies
prescribe that rms set a regular markup  in periods without sales, and periodically reduce the
markup to , for  2 [0; 1], every { periods. Formally, we consider strategies in which all rms set
prices along the equilibrium path so that for some { 2 f2; 3; :::g
pt =
8<: (1 + )c if mod(t;{) 6= 0(1 + )c if mod(t;{) = 0 ,
where mod(t;{) 6= 0 denotes the { modulo of the time period t. Such strategies may be interpreted
as a cyclical sales policy in which all rms jointly reduce prices every { periods.3 Deviations from
the equilibrium path are punished via reversion to competitive pricing in each future time period.
Thus, for any history ht 2 H of length t, a sale strategy  prescribes to set prices so that
(ht) =
8<: pt if piz = pz for any i and any z  tc otherwise .
money sooner to stock units.
3The web-appendix shows how results can be generalized to allow for asynchronized sales.
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The equilibrium punishment strategy is Nash in any subgame in which a deviation has already
occurred, since no rm can benet from a unilateral deviation when all the other rms are pricing
competitively. Therefore, the incentives to comply with a sale strategy are pinned down entirely
by looking only at deviations from the equilibrium path. Let t() denote the present-discounted
value of aggregate prots on the equilibrium path at time t. Similarly, let t() denote the present
discounted-value of the most protable deviation from the equilibrium path. Finally, let the ratio
of equilibrium to deviation prots, t=t, be denoted by Rt. The next result characterizes the
upper-bound on market size for which a sale strategy constitutes a Subgame Perfect equilibrium
(SPE).
Remark 2 A sale strategy  is a SPE of the innite repetition of the game if and only if
n  Rt() for any t  0. (1)
The result holds as the fraction of aggregate prots that a rm earns on the equilibrium path, t=n,
never exceeds the gains from a unilateral deviation, t, when condition 1 holds. Condition 1 imposes
an upper-bound on the largest number of rms that can collude on a strategy  in a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Such a bound is dened by the map n() = mint0Rt(), and as expected, for any
strategy without sales (and thus without storage) condition 1 simplies to the common requirement
n  1
1  .
Throughout, we refer to the strategies dened in this section as sale strategies. Any one of these
strategies will be completely pinned down by the three parameters: the regular markup , the sales
discount 1 , and the sale frequency {. Throughout the analysis restricts attention to sale strategies
for which the regular markup in periods without sales is bounded above by the monopoly markup
 = v c
c
. This implies that consumers without access to storage are always willing to purchase units.
Such a restriction is imposed only because any strategy with a higher markup would reduce prots
to no avail. The set of possible sale strategies will be denoted by S = (0; ] [0; 1] f2; 3; :::g.
Preliminary Results on Stability & Prots
This sub-section develops several preliminary results that compare di¤erent sales strategies in S in
terms of prots and stability. Throughout the analysis, the stability of a strategy will be evaluated
by the largest number of competitors that can collude on a given strategy  in a subgame perfect
equilibrium, n() = mint0Rt(). The analysis shows that all strategies without sales are equally
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stable, and that strategies with sales can be used to sustain larger cartels at the expense of prots.
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of strategies with sales that are more stable than
any strategy without sales are presented. These results are essential for the characterization of the
trade-o¤ between cartel prots and cartel size that will be developed in the following sections.
The following two denitions clarify the intent of our analysis. For a xed discount factor , the
stability of a strategy  will be determined by the largest number of rms n() that can collude on .
The protability of a strategy will instead, be determined by the present discounted value of prots
at time zero.
Denition 1 A sale strategy  is said to be more stable than strategy 0 if n()  n(0).
Denition 2 A sale strategy  is said to be more protable than strategy 0 if 0()  0(0).
An alternative, but similar, denition of stability may involve the oor of the map n(). But similar
conclusions would hold.4
In order to compare the stability of any two sale strategies, it is convenient to express equilibrium
and deviation prots in terms of the parameters of the strategy. Since no consumer has any units
stored at the beginning of the game (s0 = 0), it is possible to recursively dene the equilibrium
demand dt and storage st in each period t  0 as follows
dt = d(st;p
t), dSt = dS(st;pt), and st+1 = st + dSt   1.
The next remark shows that, since any sale strategy is cyclical, it is without loss to consider only the
rst { periods to characterize the entire stream of payo¤s. In particular, the result shows that no
consumer has units stored in periods of sales, and that the evolution of aggregate demand is cyclical.
Remark 3 The following claims must hold:
(1) no consumer has stored units in periods of sales: if mod(t;{) = 0, st = 0;
(2) demand is constant at congruent dates of the cycle: if mod(t;{) = mod(z;{), dt = dz.
The claim follows from the properties of the equilibrium pricing path p and of the map dS(st;pt),
and implies that consumers have the same demand at congruent dates in the cycle. Let S(t) denote
4Alternatively, the analysis could have focused on the lowest possible discount factor () needed to collude on
strategy  in a population of xed size n. But doing so would have complicated the analysis without a¤ecting our
conclusions.
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the number of periods after date t that have to elapse before the next sale takes place,
S(t) =
8<: 0 if mod(t;{) = 0{  mod(t;{) if mod(t;{) 6= 0 .
For any sale strategy  and for any period t 2 f1; :::;{   1g, equilibrium aggregate prots satisfy
t() =
1  
1  {
P{ 1
z=0 
zt+z(p
t+z) =
=
1  
1  {
hP{ 1
z=0 
zdt+z
  (1  )S(t)d0ic,
where the rst term of the nal expression computes prots as if no sales ever took place, while the
second term adjusts prots for the markdown o¤ered in periods of sales. Since a unilateral deviation
to price y 6= pt at stage t implies reversion to competitive pricing in any future period, for y < pt
the deviation payo¤s at each stage are determined by the surplus that a rm can extract during the
deviation period, and satisfy
t(y; ) = (1  )(y   c)d(st;yt).
For convenience, dene three relevant classes of sale strategies for which preliminary results are
developed. The rst class N consists of all those sale strategies for which no discount is ever o¤ered
along the equilibrium path. The second class C comprises all those strategies in which consumers
with access to storage purchase only in periods with sales. While the third class E  C will be the
main focus of our analysis, as we will establish that only strategies belonging to this subset of C can
foster collusion when compared to strategies that do not employ sales. Formally dene the three sets
of strategies as follows.
Denition 3 Let N  S denote those strategies such that  = 1.
Let C  S denote those strategies for which {  S + 1 and (1 + )  { 1 (1 + ).
Let E  C denote those strategies for which 0{S+0  .
The two conditions in the denition of C imply respectively that the salesfrequency cannot exceed
the storage capacity, and that any consumer with access to storage purchases units only in periods
of sales. The latter restriction is often referred to as the storage constraint, and is often expressed as
  { 1

1 +
1


  1

.
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The remainder of this section shows that the additional constraint in the denition of the set E
requires revenues in periods of sales to exceed revenues in periods without sales. This observation
will then be exploited to establish that E consists of all those strategies with equilibrium sales which
are more stable than any strategy without sales.
The next proposition establishes several introductory results on the stability and on the protabil-
ity of di¤erent sale strategies. In particular, it shows that any two sales strategies in which no sales
take place are equally stable, and that any sale strategy in which consumers with storage purchase
units during no-sales periods is dominated both in terms of prots and in terms of stability by a
strategy in which sales never take place. The latter observation considerably simplies the analysis,
and will be exploited to characterize the set of sale strategies that sustain collusion in industries in
which the number of competitors is too large to collude on the revenue maximizing no-sale strategy,
 =  and  = 1.5
Proposition 4 The following claims must hold:
(1) if  = 1, all consumers purchase units every period, thus N  SnC;
(2) any strategy in N is more stable than any strategy in SnC;
(3) any strategy that sets  =  and  = 1 is prot maximizing within S;
(4) for any strategy in C, st = S(t) and
dt =
8<: 0 + {S if mod(t;{) = 00 if mod(t;{) 6= 0 .
The rst two parts proposition establish that no-sales strategies are more stable than any other
sale strategy in which consumers with access to storage purchase units in a period without sales
(i.e. strategies in SnC), and imply that all no-sale strategies (i.e. strategies in N ) are equally
stable. These results obtain, since a deviation is more protable in periods of high demand when no
markdown takes place, as a rm deviating by an innitesimal discount would be able to supply the
entire market at the regular price. This should also, clarify why sales were assumed to take place in
the initial period, since any sale strategy violating such a requirement would necessarily belong to
SnC. The third part of the proposition is trivial, and establishes that no-sales monopoly pricing is
revenue maximizing among all the sales strategies. The last part of the proposition can be used to
simplify equilibrium and deviation payo¤s for any strategy in C, as it implies that consumers with
5Recall that  = v cc denotes the monopoly markup in our framework.
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access to storage purchase exactly { units in every period of sales, and none otherwise. In particular,
for any strategy  2 C equilibrium payo¤s satisfy
t() =

0 +
1  
1  { 
S(t) [({S + 0)  0]

c,
where the rst term consists of the revenue made by selling only to consumers without storage at
the regular markup, and where the second term accounts for the revenues made in periods with sales
adjusted by the discount. The revenue maximizing deviation payo¤s for any strategy  2 C instead,
satisfy
t() = max
y
t(y; ) =
8<: (1  )c if mod(t;{) = 0(1  )0c if mod(t;{) 6= 0 .
For any sale strategy in C deviation payo¤s decline (when compared to a similar strategy, but with
no markdown, 1    = 0) both in periods with no sales (as fewer consumers purchase units upon
observing a deviation) and in periods with sales (as no consumer purchases more than a single unit
at a discount in the wake of an imminent price war). The corresponding prot ratios for any strategy
 2 C thus, satisfy
Rt() =
8<:
1
1 
0

+ 1
1 x

({S + 0)  0

if mod(t;{) = 0
1
1  +
1
1 { 
S(t)
h
({S + 0) 0   1
i
if mod(t;{) 6= 0
.
Sale strategies in C will improve stability whenever deviation prots decline more than equilibrium
prots. For such strategies, the critical ratios Rt() are una¤ected by the regular markup , but
decrease with  in periods with sales, but increase with  otherwise.
The previous observations identify E as the set of sale strategies that belong to C for which rev-
enues in periods of sales to exceed revenues in periods without sales. This requirement imposes a
lower-bound on the sales discount that guarantees that deviation prots decline more than equilib-
rium prots, when compared to strategies that do not display equilibrium path sales. By exploiting
this observation the next proposition, establishes that sales strategies in E are more stable than any
strategy outside E , and consequently more stable than strategies without sales. Thus, a strategy in
E , although less protable than the revenue maximizing no-sale strategy, may be desirable as more
competitors may collude on it. Moreover, since all such strategies belong to C, sales take place along
the equilibrium path.
Proposition 5 Any strategy in E is more stable than any strategy in SnE. Moreover, E contains a
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strategy with a cycle of length { 2 f2; :::; S + 1g if and only if
{ 1  v   c
v
0
{   0({   1) +
c
v
. (2)
The proposition is proven by establishing that whenever a strategy belongs to C it is without loss to
ignore all, but the rst two periods, in order to characterize its stability.6 Such a conclusion coupled
with the observation that the maximal cartel size n() is independent of  and single peaked in  for
any given {, implies all strategies in E must be more stable than any without sales. Whenever the
set E has a non-empty interior sale strategies exist that are strictly more stable than any strategy
without sales. If so, sales are necessary to sustain collusion along the equilibrium path when the
market is large. Consequently, a strategy  2 E will be strictly more stable than a strategy without
sales if and only if
 2

0
S{ + 0
;
+ 1

{ 1   1


.
This requirement is exploited in the second part of the argument to derive necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for the set E to be non-empty. Such conditions jointly discipline all the free parameters
of the model, namely: the fraction of consumers with storage S, the protability of the market
v   c, and the discount factor . It is easy to verify that, at a given a cycle of length {, more sale
strategies will belong to E whenever either S, or v   c, or  increase.7 Furthermore, as the bound
on the discount factor arises from the storage constraint, condition 2 would only discipline the time-
preferences of the consumers, if those were to di¤er from the time-preferences of the rms. However,
even when the two coincide, the restriction imposed on  remains independent of the number of rms
in the market. A consequence of the result is that E is non-empty whenever   v c
v
0
2 0 +
c
v
.
Before proceeding to the next section, for notational convenience, dene ({) as the unique
positive root of the following quadratic equation
R1(({);{) = R0(({);{),
if such a solution exists in [0; 1], and set ({) = 1 otherwise. The analysis will show that such a
markdown can maximize stability at a given sale frequency {, when consumers with access to storage
purchase units only during periods of sales. The details of the derivation of ({) and the proof of
6This is the case, since in any period without sales, deviation prots coincide, whereas equilibrium prots increase
as the sales loom closer, by denition of E .
7A proof of this observation can be found in the web-appendix.
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uniqueness are deferred to web-appendix. Further, dene ({) as the smallest sales discount for
which consumers with access to storage would purchase { units in periods of sales when the regular
markup is set at the monopoly level,  = (v   c)=c,
({) =
v
v   c
{ 1   c
v   c .
3 Homogeneous Consumers
To highlight the nature of the prot-size trade-o¤, we begin by restricting attention to simple
economies in which all consumers are homogeneous and have access to storage, S = 1. Two
main results are presented within this stylized framework. The rst establishes that sales strategies
in S are always prot maximizing for the industry when storage capacity is unbounded. The second
result instead, compares sale strategies in S in terms of cartel prots and cartel size (stability), and
shows that a trade-o¤ emerges between the two. The existence of such a trade-o¤ in environments
in which consumers are homogenous provides a novel rationale for sales which in contrast to the vast
majority of the literature does not rely on consumer heterogeneity. These results are central to the
analysis, and establish why sales may foster collusion in large markets.
The analysis carried out in the previous section only compared sale strategies within S. However,
within this simplied setup the restriction to periodic sales strategies is without loss. In fact, the
next proposition shows that, when S =1, for any aggregate prot level that obtains in a Subgame
Perfect equilibrium of the game, there exists a (weakly) higher prot level can be supported in an
equilibrium in which strategies belong to S. The result is proven only for trigger strategies in which
defections are punished via reversion to competitive pricing. This restriction however, has no bite
here, as a straightforward extension of arguments developed in Abreu 1988 could be used show to
any SPE payo¤ can be sustained in trigger strategies.
Proposition 6 If S = 1 and S = 1, for any SPE trigger strategy  with prots () there exist
a SPE sale strategy ^ 2 S such that (^)  ().
The argument is proven: by considering the interval between two periods of positive demand in
which the strategy  yields the highest per-period prots; and by showing that a sale strategy ^ 2 S
supports even higher per-period prots in equilibrium throughout the game. The proof is simplied
by the two assumptions invoked, because an innite storage capacity implies that consumers only
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purchase units when they have none stored, and because per-period prots simplify when consumers
are homogeneous.8
The previous observation and proposition 5 imply that it is without loss to restrict attention to
strategies in E in order to characterize the prot maximizing sale strategy for an industry with any
number of competitors. For any such strategy, rms cannot gain from a deviation when storage is
positive for all consumers, as no units would be purchased upon observing a deviation. The incentives
to comply with a sale strategy are therefore pinned down by the deviation gains during periods of
sales, which always attract unit demand, as consumers expect lower prices in the future due to the
retaliatory nature of the trigger punishments. When S = 1, aggregate prots and stability of any
sale strategy  2 E respectively simplify to
 () =
(1  ){
1  { c and n() =
{
1  { .
The stability of a given sale strategy is independent of the markup charged during periods of sales.
However, the maximal number of rms that can collude on a given sale strategy increases with {,
which implies that strategies with infrequent sales may foster collusion. Aggregate prots instead,
increase in the sale markup .
The next proposition highlights the specic nature of the trade-o¤ between cartel prots and
cartel size that di¤erent sale strategies entail. In particular, the result explicitly characterizes for
any storage capacity S the largest number of rms N() that could enter the market at a given prot
level  without it unraveling to a competitive equilibrium. The maximal cartel size always decreases
as equilibrium prots increase. In this context, the proposition establishes the strategy (; ({);{)
is prot maximizing among all sale strategies with frequency {, provided that ({) = { 1v c
v c  0. It
then proceeds to show that the industry maximizing aggregate prots, 0 (; ({);{), decline with
{, as less frequent sales must be met by larger discounts to attract the desired demand. A trade-o¤
between cartel prots and cartel size emerges, because infrequent sales lower prots, but increase
the number of competitors that can collude on a given strategy. The result also establishes that
consumer heterogeneity is not essential in explaining periodic sales. For convenience, let {^ denote
the largest value of { such that ({)  0 if such value is does not exceed S + 1, and let {^ = S + 1
8The result and its proof could also, be extended to the general framework 0 > 0 and S < 1. However, several
technical complications would arise.
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otherwise. Also, denote equilibrium prots when the markdown is set to the storage constraint by
{ = 0 (; ({);{) =
(1  ){
1  { (
{ 1v   c).
Observe that 1 = v   c coincides with the monopoly prot.
Proposition 7 If S = 1, for any prot level  2 (0;1] the maximal number rms that can collude
on  while employing a sale strategy satises
N() =
8<: {1 { if  2 ({+1;{] for { 2 f1; :::; {^   1g{^
1 {^ if  2 (0;{^]
.
Moreover, strategy (; ({);{) 2 S is prot maximizing among all sale strategies with frequency {.
When all consumers are homogeneous, the prot-size trade-o¤ is pinned down by a decreasing step
function in which maximal cartel size decreases as prots increase. Price uctuations along the
equilibrium path thus reduce the incentives to deviate. These results obtain, as the drop in demand
in response to deviations is most pronounced when consumers anticipate purchasing large number
of units. Thus, periodic sales may be exploited to collude on positive prots even when constant
pricing is not incentive compatible. Because all consumers are homogeneous, units are sold only
during period of sales. The next sections depart from some of stark assumptions invoked here, and
show how results extend to environments in which players di¤er either in their ability to store units,
or in their ability to predict future prices. In these more realistic setups, units will be sold in every
period along the equilibrium path.
Figure 1: The plot depicts the prot-stability trade-o¤N() characterized in proposition 7.
18
4 Heterogeneous Consumers
This section considers environments in which some consumers do not have access to storage 0 > 0.
Results again compare di¤erent sale strategies in S both in terms of cartel prots and in terms of
cartel size. The rst two propositions characterize two relevant strategies in E . The former will be
the most stable sale strategy, while the latter will be the most protable of all the sale strategies
in E . Whenever the two strategies do not coincide, a trade-o¤ between cartel prots and stability
will emerge even within E . Such results establish why sales may be necessary to collude in large
markets even when only a fraction of consumers responds to price uctuations. The second part of
the section instead, presents an explicit characterization of the prot-size trade-o¤ for economies in
which S = 1. The restriction to economies with unit-storage is imposed only for sake of tractability,
as numerous qualitative features of the trade-o¤ are not a¤ected by this assumption.
General Storage
We begin with the characterization of the sale strategy that maximizes the number of competitors
that can collude in equilibrium. To do so, we argue that, whenever ({) satises the storage con-
straint, a discount of 1 ({)maximizes stability at given sale frequency {. For convenience, identify
two particular sale frequencies, { and {. In particular, let { denote the frequency of sales that max-
imizes time-zero stability among all frequencies that satisfy the storage constraint, ({)  ({); and
let { denote the smallest frequency for which the storage constraint is violated at discount 1 ({).
Formally, let
{ = arg max
{2f2;:::;S+1g
R0(({);{) s.t. ({)  ({),
{ = arg min
{2f2;:::;S+1g
{ s.t. ({) < ({).
Now consider three alternative scenarios: (i) ({) > ({) for any frequency { 2 f2; :::; S + 1g; (ii)
({) < ({) for any { 2 f2; :::; S + 1g; and (iii) otherwise. The rst scenario describes environments
in which the stability maximizing markdown 1   ({) meets the storage constraint at any sale
frequency {; the second scenario describes environments in which 1  ({) always fails to meet the
storage constraint; while the third scenario covers the remaining cases. The next result characterizes
the sale strategy that maximizes equilibrium cartel size in each of these three cases. Such a strategy
requires rms to price at the monopoly markup in periods without sales, and uniquely pins down
the optimal discount for the remaining periods. In the rst scenario, the discount coincides with
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the stability maximizing markdown 1  ({), and sales occur every { periods in order to maximize
stability in periods of sales. In the second scenario instead, the discount is determined by the storage
constraint (it amounts to 1   ({)), and sales occur every { periods so to maximize stability in
periods without sales. In the third and intermediate scenario, the strategy coincides with one of the
two previous cases.
Proposition 8 Assume that E 6= ; and 0 > 0. If (i) holds, or if (iii) holds and R0(({); {) >
R1(({); {), then no strategy in S is strictly more stable than strategy  2 E
  {
 ({) {
,
otherwise, no strategy in S is strictly more stable than strategy  2 E
  {
 ({) {
.
Moreover,  is the most protable of all the strategies in S with equal stability.
The most stable strategy often displays infrequent sales, { > 2. Infrequent sales can benet
stability, as the incentives to deviate can decline when larger discounts are o¤ered to induce players
to store multiple units. The stability maximizing discount and frequency of sales crucially depend
on the fraction of consumers with storage, on the discount rate, and on the monopoly markup in
the economy.9 Strategy  is however, independent of the number of rms in the market. Thus,
the largest number of rms willing to collude on a strategy in S can be found by looking at n().
The monopoly markup is charged in periods without sales since  has no e¤ect on the stability
(cartel size). The optimal sales discount 1   is instead, chosen to maximize n() within the set of
markdowns for which the strategy belongs to E . When S = 1, the most stable sale strategy simplies
to  = (;min f(2); (2)g ; 2).10 If so, the stability maximizing discount minimizes deviation gains
across the two periods of the pricing cycle. When the storage constraint of the consumers does not
bind (2) < (2), such a markdown equalizes deviation gains across the two periods of the cycle.
9When { is dened, the sale strategy  often simplies to (; ({   1); {   1) if { > 2, and to (; (2); 2) if { = 2.
10If S = 1, (2) = min f1; g where  is the unique positive root of the quadratic equation
2 (2  )     (1  )  2 = 0.
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Even though strategy  maximizes the size of a cartel in equilibrium, more protable strategies
may exist in E . The next proposition formally establishes this insight by characterizing the most
protable sale strategy within E . As in the previous proposition, the strategy requires rms to
set collusive markups in periods without sales. The sale markdown is now however, the uniquely
pinned down by the consumers storage constraint, as larger discounts always hurt equilibrium prots.
Similarly sale frequency is uniquely pinned to 2 as infrequent sales hurt prots due to the cost of
anticipating production.
Proposition 9 If E 6= ;, no strategy in E is strictly more protable than strategy + 2 E
+ + {+
 (2) 2
.
The prot maximizing discount can obviously be smaller than that of the most stable strategy ,
and no longer depends on the fraction of consumers with storage in the economy. Consequently, the
upper-bound on the number of rms that can collude on strategy + may be strictly smaller than
for , n(+)  n().
The previous two propositions highlighted the trade-o¤ arising between cartel prots and cartel
size in environments in which 0 > 0. The rst result established that strategies displaying equi-
librium path sales could be used increase cartel size at the expense of aggregate prots. Strategy
 was proven to be more stable than any other strategy without sales, but less protable than full
collusion. Similarly,  was clearly more protable and less stable, than the competitive outcome
(i.e. the Nash equilibrium of the stage game). The second result instead, showed that even within
E prot-size trade-o¤s would persist, provided that + and  di¤ered. An additional conclusion of
such propositions implied that infrequent sales would occasionally increase cartel size compared to
strategies with more frequent sales, without hurting prots.
To conclude this part of the analysis, consider an economy in which  = 0:95, 0 = 0:15, v = 10,
and c = 1. If S = 1, the maximal equilibrium cartel size grows from 20 to 28 when rms switch
form the monopoly strategy m to the most stable sale strategy 1. But when S = 30, the maximal
cartel size is attained by a strategy with infrequent sales which take place every 21 periods. Maximal
cartel size grows to 37 when rms collude on the most stable sale strategy 30. Since sales occur
less frequently smaller discounts are necessary to sustain the maximal cartel size. Thus, the prots
of the most stable strategy 30 can be larger than those associated to the most stable strategy 

1
21
in an economy in which at most a single unit can be stored S = 1. The prot-size trade-o¤ can
therefore decline when consumers gain access to more e¢ cient storage technologies. The following
table reports all the relevant variables for the example discussed.
n    {
m 20:0 9:00 1:00 9 8
+ 20:5 8:72 0:94 9 2
1 28:6 1:96 0:15 9 2
30 37:4 4:62 0:27 9 21
Unit Storage S = 1 & The Prot-Size Trade-o¤
When at most one unit can be stored, a more stringent characterization of the prot-stability trade-o¤
is possible. In particular, observe that the previous propositions implied that increasing the regular
markup , would increase cartel prots and not decrease cartel size; and that decreasing the sales
markdown 1 , would increase prots, and decrease cartel size if and only if  2 [(2); (2)]. With
a slight abuse of notation, for any strategy  = (; ; 2) let n() = n() denote the maximal number
of rms that can collude on strategy  in equilibrium, and let () = 0() denote the prots raised
by the strategy . Since the prots () strictly increase in the sale markdown , it is possible to
compute the maximal number of rms N() that can collude on prot level  while employing a
sale strategy. In particular, for any cartel prot level  2 R+ it follows that
N() = n( 1()).
A trade-o¤ emerges between cartel prots and cartel size for any markdown  2 [(2); (2)]. The
maximal number of rms that can sustain a collusive sale strategy declines as prots increase. This is
the case as prots obviously decrease in the sale markdown 1 , while cartel size increases. Within
the range [(2); (2)], the maximal number of rms that can collude on a strategy  = (; ; 2)
declines with , as deviations become more protable in periods of sales,11
dN()
d
=
dn=d
d=d
( 1()) =
dR0=d
d0=d
(;  1(); 2)  0.
11A formal derivation of these observations appears in the web-appendix.
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Moreover, any sale strategy  = (; ; 2) raising more prots by setting  > (2) would be outper-
formed both in terms of prots and in terms of cartel size by a strategy without sales in which all
units are sold at the monopoly markup (as no player would store units in either scenario). Simi-
larly, any strategy setting  < (2) would simultaneously reduce both cartel size and prots when
compared to strategy .
For convenience let m = v   c denote the monopoly prot, and let  and + respectively
denote the prots of the most stable and of the most protable strategies in E
 =

0
1 + 
+
2  0
1 + 


(v   c),
+ =

0
1 + 
+
2  0
1 + 
+

(v   c).
The next proposition highlights the specic nature of the trade-o¤ between cartel prots and cartel
size that di¤erent sale strategies entail. In particular, the result explicitly characterizes the largest
number of rms N() that could enter the market at a given prot level  without it unraveling to
a competitive equilibrium. The maximal cartel size always decreases as equilibrium prots increase.
Furthermore, in the interval (;+], N() is strictly decreasing and convex provided that 0 > 0,
and by construction satises N() > 1=(1   ). When prots fall below  however, the maximal
cartel size is no longer a¤ected by further reduction in prots, and coincides with the maximal cartel
size of the most stable sales strategy n(). Similarly, when prots exceed +, the cartel size no
longer responds to further increases in prots, and coincides with the maximal cartel size of any
no-sale strategy 1=(1  ).
Proposition 10 If E 6= ;, for any prot level  2 (0;m] the maximal number rms that can collude
on  while employing a sale strategy satises
N() =
8>>><>>>:
1
1  if  2 (+;m]
1
1 
(2 0)
(1+) 0(v c) if  2 (;+]
1
1 
(2 0)
(1+) 0(v c) if  2 (0;]
.
The prot-stability trade-o¤ emerges, because larger sale discounts occasionally favor stability, but
certainly hurt prots. In the limit case in which all consumers have access to storage, 0 = 0, the
trade-o¤ persists as a simple step function, since N() = 2=(1  2) for any   +. The left plot
of gure 2 depicts R1() and R0() and shows that for any value of { a unique discount ({) exists
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which maximizes the size of the cartel. The right plot instead, depicts prot-stability trade-o¤N()
derived in the previous proposition.
Figure 2: The left plot depicts R1() and R0() as functions of , where ({) = 0=(S{ + 0). The
right plot depicts the prot-stability trade-o¤N().
The last result of the section shows how changes in the environment might a¤ect the prot-size
trade-o¤. Comparative statics are developed for the four relevant free parameters of the model, ,
0, v and c. Results are discussed in detail after the statement of the proposition.
Proposition 11 If E 6= ;, for any prot level  2 (0;m] the maximal number rms that can collude
on  while employing a sale strategy satises
dN() d d0 dv dc
 2 (+;m] + 0 0 0
 2 (;+] + ? +  
 2 (0;] \  6= + +   0 0
 2 (0;] \  = + +   +  
where dN()=d0 > 0 if and only if  > = (2m   ). Moreover, the cut-o¤ prot levels  and
+ and the maps  and  evaluated at { = 2 and (2)  (2) further satisfy
d d0 dv dc
d+ + + +  
d   + +  
d   + 0 0
d + 0 +  
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The result shows that increasing patience (i.e. reducing storage costs) can lead to larger equilibrium
cartels at any prot level, and to the persistence of the prot-size trade-o¤on a larger range of prots.
Increasing the protability of the market (i.e. v c) instead, increases the maximal equilibrium cartel
size, but only for intermediate prot levels, since the stability n() is independent of values and costs
when evaluated both at the most stable strategy  and at the monopoly strategy m. The result also
establishes that increasing the fraction of consumers without storage (i.e. 0) reduces the stability
of the most stable sale strategy  as intertemporal linking between decisions declines. The e¤ect
of such a change on the maximal cartel size at intermediate prot values is instead, ambiguous, as
a large fraction of consumer with storage may lead to lower equilibrium prots due to the cost of
anticipating production. Clearly, the same change would have no e¤ect on the stability of strategies
without sales, since no consumer would store units.
Figure 3: Comparative statics on the trade-o¤N() with respect to an increase: in  (top left), in 0 (top
right), in v (bottom left), and in c (bottom right).
The range of prots for which the prot-stability trade-o¤ persists declines as the number of con-
sumers without access to storage grows, and eventually vanishes at some value  < 1 (i.e. when
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su¢ ciently few consumers have access to storage). The discount o¤ered during a period with sales
(i.e. 1 ) in the most protable policy + declines with patience and protability, but is una¤ected
by the fraction of consumers with storage. The discount o¤ered in the most stable strategy  (when
such strategy does not coincide with +) instead, grows with patience and the fraction of consumers
with storage, but is una¤ected by protability. Figure 3 provides a visual characterization of the
comparative statics results presented in the previous proposition.
5 Buyers and Beliefs
Two features of the model played an important role in the construction of the prot-size trade-
o¤, namely consumer beliefs about future prices, and the trigger punishments. In particular, the
rationality imposed on consumers storing units implied that such buyers would always understand
how deviations would a¤ect future prices. The results developed however, are robust to numerous
alternative specications provided that at least some consumers understand that unexpected price
cuts might lead with some positive probability to lower prices for some time in the future. This
section estabishes that an intertemporal link in demand persists even if no consumer is able to revise
his beliefs about future prices upon observing a deviation. In this scenario, the stability of strategies
both with and without sales declines, because consumers may prefer to purchase multiple units upon
observing a deviation if they expect prices to remain high in the future. However, even in such
environments strategies with sales may display a higher stability than strategies without sales, as
unexpected price cuts might attract a smaller demand whenever consumers have units already stored.
To make this point, again consider environments in which 0 > 0 and S = 1. But now suppose
that buyers understand price dynamics on the equilibrium path, but not o¤ the equilibrium path. If
so, no player revises its beliefs about future prices when a deviation is observed. In such environments,
given any equilibrium price path, p, and any prole of posted prices in period t, pt, consumer demand
amounts to dt(st; fpt;pt+1g). The change in beliefs never a¤ects equilibrium prots, but a¤ects
deviation gains. The next and nal result establishes that even within this framework, collusion
may be fostered by strategies that display sales along the equilibrium path. The result obtains
as deviating rms can exploit the lack of foresight from buyers to increase prots by selling more
units when undercutting the equilibrium price. Therefore, sales may foster collusion as demand is
constrained by storage capacity in periods in which high prices are charged.
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In these environments, deviation payo¤s for any strategy without sales,  = (; 1;{) 2 N , satisfy
() = (1  ) maxf(2  0)^(); gc,
where ^() denotes the largest markup at which consumers with access to storage would stockpile
units when a deviation takes place, ^() = (1 + )   1. Firms may exploit buyersbeliefs to sell
more than a single unit despite the price war that would arise when a deviation takes place deviation.
Thus, the stability of a strategy  2 N satises
n() =
1
1   min

1;

(2  0)^()

.
A trade-o¤ arises even among strategies in N , as high markups increase prots, but reduce the
stability of strategies without sales. The maximal number of rms that can collude on a strategy
without sales is bounded above by previous critical threshold 1
1  . For a periodic sale strategy  2
C instead, deviation payo¤s satisfy
t() =
8<: (1  )(2  0)c if mod(t;{) = 0(1  ) max f~(); 0g c if mod(t;{) = 1 ,
where ~() denote the largest markup at which consumers with positive storage would purchase an
additional unit when a deviation takes place in a period without sales, ~() = (1 + )  1. Given
buyersbeliefs, deviations now attract the full supply in periods of sales. However, in periods without
sales deviation gains may increase when rms benet from selling to consumers with already units
in storage. Consequently the stability of any strategy  2 C is given by
n() =
1
1  2 min

[0 + (2  0)]
(2  0) ;
[0 + (2  0)]
max f~(); 0g

.
A trade-o¤ emerges even among strategies in C, as high markups in periods of sales increase prots,
but reduce the stability. The maximal number of rms that can collude on a strategy sales is remains
bounded above by 1
1  . The next proposition characterizes the prot-stability trade-o¤ for strategies
with and without sales, and shows why sales can foster collusion when consumers are su¢ ciently
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patient. For convenience, dene two relevant payto¤ thresholds,
n =
(2  0)(1  )
(2  0)   1 c and 
s = 0(v   c).
Proposition 12 If  is su¢ ciently high, the following claims must hold:
(1) the maximal number rms that can collude on  while employing a strategy in N satises
Nn() =
8<: 11  if  2 (0;n]1
1 

(2 0)[(+c) c] if  2 (n;m]
,
(2) the maximal number rms that can collude on  while employing a strategy in C satises
Ns() =
8<: 11  if  2 (0;s]1
1 

(1+) 0(v c) if  2 (s;+]
,
(3) there exists a range of prots (n;) on which Nn() < Ns() for some  2 (s;+].
Figure 4 characterizes the results described in proposition 12. In these environments, sales may foster
collusion at intermediate prot levels. This is the case as deviation from a strategy with no sales can
attract a demand of (2 0) provided that su¢ ciently big discount is o¤ered, whereas deviation from
a strategy with sales can attract such demand only when the price is already low (and no consume
has units stored). The change in consumer rationality also implies that no sale strategy sustains
a cartel-size larger than 1
1  , in contrast to the results derived for rational buyers where strategies
with sales exceeded such bound. In this scenario, N() = maxfNn(); Ns()g when  < , and
N() = Nn() otherwise.
Figure 4: The plot depicts the prot-stability trade-o¤N().
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The result highlights why the trade-o¤ between prots and stability is resilient to alternative as-
sumptions on consumer rationality, and shows why sales may be used to foster collusion even in such
environments.
6 Comments and Conclusions
The analysis introduced a novel rationale for sales in an industry in which a homogeneous storable
good is produced by n rms, and sold to consumers with access to storage. In this context, the
paper examined the e¤ects of storage on rmsincentives to hold periodic sales to support a greater
degree of collusion. Sales were proven to strengthen the incentives to collude, as storage would
intertemporally link consumer demand and thus, reduce the short-run gains from a deviation. In
particular, the analysis showed that if a market was su¢ ciently large, rms had to periodically reduce
prices in order to sustain collusion. Such behavior was proven to reduce the incentives to deviate both
in regular price periods (as only consumers without storage would purchase units), and in periods
with sales (as consumers with storage would curtail their demand, if a deviation were observed in
the wake of an imminent price war).
The rst part of the analysis characterized consumer demand and the set E of sale strategies
which allowed for a greater degree of collusion than any strategy without sales. The second part of
the analysis identied the sale strategies maximizing cartel size and cartel prots within the set E .
A trade-o¤ was shown to emerge between cartel prots and size. The trade-o¤ and its dependence
on the environment were explicitly characterized in several scenarios. The relationship between
the optimal sale markdown and the environment was also explored. The third and nal part of the
analysis established instead, that the trade-o¤would persist even in environments in which deviations
would not not a¤ect consumer beliefs about future prices. In such setups however, the nature of the
prot-size trade-o¤ di¤ered signicantly, as unexpected price reduction would never cause demand
to decline.
Critical Comments, Robustness, Evidence:
Asynchronous Sales: Although the analysis focused on periodic sales strategies with synchronized
sales, numerous conclusions extend to strategies in which rms do not coordinate their behavior. A
section of the web-appendix tackles such concerns explicitly.
Storage, Income, and Rationality: Results were presented in the context of a model with rational
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consumers and heterogeneous storage technologies. Alternative interpretations are however, possi-
ble. Notably, the results developed in section 4 would immediately apply to a model in which: some
consumers simply do not expect prices to rise sharply in future periods, and thus purchase a single
unit in every period in which the price does not exceed their value;12 while the remaining consumers
understand price dynamics in the market and purchase the optimal number of units given the ex-
pected future price path. If so, myopic buyers may also be seen as consumers whose the opportunity
cost of investing time in understanding future price dynamics is higher. This interpretation could
thus, be exploited match evidence suggesting that middle income households are more responsive
to sales, as very low income households are constrained in their ability to store, while high income
households have a higher value for time, and thus do not necessarily invest in taking advantage of
sales (Gri¢ th, Leibtag, Leicester and Nevo 2009 and Gauri, Sudhir and Talukdar 2009).
In the rational consumer model, along the equilibrium path demand expands to its maximum
level in any period of sales. In such periods however, retaliatory punishments and rationality imply
that demand would contract if the sale discount 1  was unexpectedly high. Although such behavior
appears hard to test as it relies on what consumers perceive as an unexpected price cut, the empirical
literature appears to have found some evidence which is at least consistent with this type of behavior.
In particular, Blattberg, Briesh and Fox 1995, a survey the empirical results on sales and promotions,
reports as one of its ndings that markdowns, that di¤er from the common price dynamics, reduce
prices expected by buyers in the future. In turn, such beliefs could in principle reduce demand, as
consumers expect prices to remain low for some time in the future. In this spirit, Mela, Jedidi and
Bowman 1998 hypothesizes that households develop price expectations on the basis of their prior
exposure to promotions over a long period of time, and argues that these expectations, coupled
with the costs of inventorying products, a¤ect consumer purchase timing and purchase quantity
decisions. In particular, evidence suggests that increasing expectations of future promotions can
lead to a reduced likelihood of purchase incidence on a given shopping trip. Although the evidence is
not conclusive, empirical papers on promotions consistently show that unexpected pricing behavior
of rms does in fact a¤ect consumer beliefs about future pricing behavior. Our model presents a
simple framework in which the intertemporal link in consumer beliefs can be exploited to enhance
collusion. More elaborated models in which irrationality and brand loyalty play a more prominent
role may be better suited to explain the numerous regularities that appear in the empirical literature
12These consumers always expect pt > pt+1, and therefore always demand a single unit in every period of the game
even if deviations are observed.
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on promotions. However, in all these models a link in demand can emerge if expected future prices
a¤ect optimal stockpiling decisions, and in turn such a link might be exploited to enhance collusion
by endogenously generating demand cycles along the equilibrium path.
Unknown Storage Capacity: The analysis was developed for economies in which the storage capacity
of consumers was known to rms. However, all results on single-unit storage would equivalently
apply to a model in which: 0 denotes the fraction of players without access to storage; while S
denotes the fraction of players that can store at least one unit (but possibly more). Clearly, such a
change in the setup would not alter expected demand if employ sale strategies that cut prices every
two periods, as no consumer would ever purchase more than two units in any given period. Thus,
although results of section 4 would no longer characterize the optimal punishments, they would still
show how sales may foster collusion at the expense of prots.
Sales Strategies, and Bundling: The analysis did restrict attention to cyclical sale strategies in S.
Alternative equilibrium pricing strategies in which sales do not take place at congruent dates might
also, enhance collusion by creating an intertemporal link in demand. However, no such strategy could
be as stable as the optimal sale strategy in S. In fact, if no units were stored along the equilibrium
path the incentives to collude would decline by an argument equivalent to proposition 5. But if units
were stored, the incentives to collude would decline in one of the periods in which consumers purchase
multiple units, as the evolution of future prices would di¤er from the optimal strategy characterized
here. The restriction to sales strategies S also, implied that rms were conned to setting a linear
price in every period at which to sell all the units demanded. Thus, bundling and non-linear pricing
were ruled out of the model by assumption. However, it would be possible to show that allowing
rms to sell bundles of di¤erent sizes at di¤erent prices would not alter the prot-size trade-o¤within
the proposed framework, as the prot-maximizing strategy at any cartel size would require pricing
all bundles a constant marginal price.
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7 Appendix
Proof Remark 1. Part (1) of the claim is trivial. To prove (2) notice that by construction
dS(s;p
t) 2 [0; S + 1  s]. The upper-bound must hold, since no consumer can store more than S
units. The lower-bound must hold because no player can benet by disposing already purchased units
given that pz  0 for any z. Also notice that only proles of demand that guarantee a consumption
stream of a unit in every period can be optimal, since prices satisfy pz  v. Thus, payo¤ streams
can be compared by looking only at the total expenditure on consumption good.
Then, consider the case in which T (pt)  S + 1. By contradiction consider a prole of demand
for the successive T (pt) periods, fdt+zgT (p
t)
z=0 and suppose that dt 6= max fT (pt)  s; 0g. If so, there
exists a prole of demands

d0t+z
	T (pt)
z=0
that costs less and that leaves the consumer with exactly as
many units stored in period t+ T (pt). In fact, consider:
d0t+z =
8>>><>>>:
max fT (pt)  s; 0g if z = 0
0 if z 2 f1; :::; T (pt)  1gPT (pt)
z=0 dt+z   d0t if z = T (pt)
by construction the prole leaves the consumer with exactly as many units stored in period t+T (pt).
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Moreover d0 costs less, since:
PT (pt)
z=0 
zpt+zdt+z =
PT (pt) 1
z=0 
zpt+zdt+z + 
T (pt)pt+T (pt)dt+T (pt) 
 pt
PT (pt) 1
z=0 dt+z + 
T (pt)pt+T (pt)dt+T (pt) =
= ptd
0
t + pt

d0t+T (pt)   dt+T (pt)

+ T (p
t)pt+T (pt)dt+T (pt) =
= ptd
0
t + 
T (pt)pt+T (pt)d
0
t+T (pt) +
h
T (p
t)pt+T (pt)   pt
i 
dt+T (pt)   d0t+T (pt)
 
 ptd0t + T (p
t)pt+T (pt)d
0
t+T (pt) =
PT (pt)
z=0 
zpt+zd
0
t+z
given that: (i)
PT (pt) 1
z=0 dz  d0t & dt+T (pt)  d0t+T (pt), since that consumers consume one unit in
every period; and (ii) T (p
t)pt+T (pt) < pt  zpt+z for any z 2 (0; T (pt)). Thus a contradiction is
established. A very similar and omitted argument works also for the case in which T (pt) > S + 1
and establishes the claim.
Proof Remark 2. The proof of the result is trivial. No player benets from a deviation along the
equilibrium path if:
t()
n
 t()
where t() denotes the most protable deviation. Such condition is exploited to pin down the
requirement on the critical discount rate. Moreover no deviation can be protable o¤ the equilibrium
path, since all players make at most zero prots when all competitors quote prices at marginal cost.
Proof of Remark 3. The rst claim is proven by induction. Note that mod(0;{) = 0 and s0 = 0.
Next we show that if st = 0 for any t  T such that mod(t;{) = 0, then it also the case that st = 0
for any t  T + { such that mod(t;{) = 0. In fact consider the largest date  such that   T and
mod( ;{) = 0. Such date exists by the initial condition and the induction hypothesis. At such date
the demand of an individual with storage satises:
dS(0;p
 ) = min fT (p ); S + 1g
Moreover T (p )  {, since (1+) > {(1+). Hence, dS(0;p )  { and s+1 < { given that one
unit will be consumed. Moreover, in any period z 2 ft+ 1; :::; t+ {   1g, since (1 +) > (1 +) >
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(1 + ), we have that T (pz)  1 and consequently
dS(sz;p
z) =
8<: 0 if sz > 01 if sz = 0 ) sz+1 =
8<: sz   1 if sz > 00 if sz = 0 .
Which establishes that s+{ = 0, since s < {. The second claim follows immediately, since from
the previous part of the proof it is straightforward to observe that
dS(st;p
t) =
8<: dS(0;p0) if mod(t;{) = 0maxf0; 1  stg if mod(t;{) 6= 0 . (3)
Proof Proposition 4. Note that (1) is immediate, because  = 1 implies dS(st;pt) = 1 for any t
as pt+1 = pt requires pt > pt+1. To prove (2), rst observe that all strategies in N are equally stable.
Note that, by the proof of (1), for any strategy  2 N equilibrium payo¤s simplify to t() = c.
Thus, a deviating player can capture at most such a prot by undercutting the price marginally.
Any deviation to a price y 2 (c; (1 + )c), must satisfy d(st;yt)  1, since pt > c and therefore
t(y; )  (1  )(y   c). Hence, t() = (1  )c and Rt() = 1=(1  ) for any t 2 f0; 1; :::g and
any  2 N . Now, consider a strategy  2 SnC and a period t in which dt > 0 and pt = (1 + )c.
Note such conditions imply that st = 0 and dt  1. If so, by pt = (1 + )c, we get that
t(y; ) = (1  )(y   c)d(st;yt) = (1  ) (y   c)
and t() = (1  )c. Moreover, if such a period exists, it must be that:
dS0 = min

T (p0); S + 1
	
< {
because of the evolution of savings and demand discussed in the previous remark (condition 3). In
turn this requires that t 1(1 + )  (1 + ) > t(1 + ) for some t 2 f1; :::;{   1g. If so, pick the
smallest t for which (1 + ) > t(1 + ) and notice that:
t() =
(1  )
1  {
hP{ 1
z=0 
zdt+z
  (1  )S(t)d0ic =
= 00t() + SSt()  c
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where the last inequality must hold since:
0t() =

1  S(t) + S(t)+1   {

+ (S(t)   S(t)+1)
1  { c  c
St() =
 
1  { t+ t({ t   { t+1)
1  { c  c ,  
 
1  t
t(1  )
The inequality bounding 0t() must hold, since it cannot be protable to cut prices on consumers
that do not alter their demand. The inequality bounding St() must hold instead, since rms prefer
to delay production costs and because t 1(1 + )  (1 + ) requires:
  1 + 
1 + 
 t 1 
Pt 1
z=0 
z
t
=
 
1  t
t(1  )
Hence, a strategy  2 SnC cannot be more stable than a strategy in N , since Rt()  1=(1  ).
The proof of (3) is trivial. The proposed strategy raises a prot of v   c, since dt = 1 for any t.
No strategy in which dt = 1 for any t can do better, since v is the highest price that a buyer willing
pay for a unit of consumption. But any other strategy such that dt 6= 1 for some t must satisfy
dS0 > 1, by the properties of the demand function derived in condition (3). In turn, if dS0 > 1, it
must be that (1 + )  (1 + ). Thus by (3), we get that prots can be expressed as follows for
some dS0 2 (1;{]:
0() =
(1  )
1  {
P{ 1
z=0 
zdz
  (1  )d0c =
=
(1  )
1  {
hh
0
PdS0 1
z=1 
z +
P{ 1
z=d0S
z
i
+ (0 + SdS0)
i
c
An argument similar to the one developed in the previous part of the proof shows that 0()  c.
In particular, write prots as 0() = 000() + SS0() and notice that for the same reason
described in part (2) 00()  c. Then let t = d0s notice that:
S0() =
 
t   {+ t(1  )
1  { c  c ,  
 
1  t
t(1  )
where the inequality bounding S0() is established by 
t 1(1 + )  (1 + ) as in part (2). This
establishes (3), since c  v   c is necessary for prots to be maximal by the properties of the
demand function. Part (4) follows trivially from condition (3) and the demand functions of both
types of consumers discussed in the text.
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Proof Proposition 5. First we establish that a strategy E in is more stable than a strategy in
N . Consider a strategy  2 E . By denition of E ,   0{S+0 . If so, R1()  1=(1  ) and for any
t 2 f1; 2; :::;{   2g:
Rt() =
1
1   +
1
1  { 
{ t

{S + 0
0
   1

 Rt+1()
since S(t) = {   t, if t  {   1. Hence, the stability of a strategy in  2 E will be pinned down by
the minimum between R0() and R1(). Moreover, R0() > 1=(1   ) since for any  and for any
{ > 1:
R0() =
1
1  
0

+
1
1  x
h
({S + 0)  0

i
 1
1  

0 +
(1  ){
1  x S

=
=
1
1  

0 +
{
1 +  + :::+ x 1
S

>
1
1  
where the rst inequality holds since dR0()=d < 0. Which establishes that if a strategy  belongs
to E then it must be more stable than any strategy in N , since mint0Rt()  1=(1   ). Since
any strategy in N is more stable than any strategy in SnC, what remains to be proven is that any
strategy in E is more stable than strategies in CnE . But this is immediate since  2 CnE implies
 < 0{S+0 , and thus R1() < 1=(1  ).
Next we establish that 2 implies the existence of a strategy with a cycle of length { 2 f2; :::; S + 1g
in E . Let constraint 2 hold for some { 2 f2; :::; S + 1g. Take any strategy that sets  = v
c
  1 and
 2

0
S{ + 0
; { 1

1 +
1


  1


(4)
at the given value {. The strategy obviously belongs to E . Moreover, such a strategy exists since
the interval in which  was chosen is non-empty, whenever 2 holds at {.
Next we establish the necessity of 2. Any strategy in E must satisfy 4 by construction. Consider
any one of these strategies, and notice that:

0
S{ + 0
; { 1

1 +
1


  1




0
S{ + 0
; { 1
v
v   c  
c
v   c

Since the non-emptiness of the bigger interval is equivalent to 2, we get that 2 being violated prevent
the existence of a policy with cycle length { in E . This establishes the necessity.
Proof Proposition 6. Consider any SPE trigger strategy , with an equilibrium price path p.
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Observe that for any deterministic equilibrium price path d(s;pt) = 0 whenever s > 0, 0 = 0 and
S =1. This follows because in the previous period in which players purchased any units (call this
period t   z), it had to be the case that pt z < zpt, which implies players would have preferred to
buy more units in period t  z rather than buying any units in period t.
Consider the implied pattern of demand dt(pt) implied by equilibrium prices p, and recall that
SPE prots satisfy
t() = (1  )
P1
z=0 
zt+z(p
t+z) = (1  )P1z=0 z (pt+z   c) dt+z(pt+z).
Let D(p) = fzjdz(pz) > 0g and Dt(p) = fz  tjdz(pz) > 0g. For any period t 2 D(p), let f(t) 2
D(p) denote the following period in which units are sold. That is df(t)(pf(t)) > 0, and dz(pz) = 0
for any z 2 ft+ 1; :::; f(t)  1g. For any period  2 D(p) let
f() () 
(1  )
(1  f()  )
Pf() 1
z= 
z  (pz   c) dz(pz) = (1  )
(1  f()  ) (p   c) d (p
 ).
Further observe that
t() = (1  )
P
z2Dt(p) 
z (pz   c) dz(pz) =
P
z2Dt(p) 
z(1  f(z) z)f(z)z () =
=
P
z2Dt(p)(
z   f(z))f(z)z ().
Thus, () = 0() is a weighted average of 0 and 
f(z)
z () for any z 2 D(p), since (z   f(z))  0
for any z 2 D(p) and sincePz2D(p)(z   f(z))  1. Thus, a period  2 D(p) always exists in which

f()
 ()  (). In particular, pick  2 arg maxz2D(p) f(z)z (). A necessary condition for strategy
 to be SPE is that R () =  ()= ()  n.
To conclude the argument, we now establish the existence of a sale strategy ^ 2 S for which:
(i) (^)  (); and (ii) n(^)  R (). This would conclude the proof as condition (ii) would
establish that ^ is SPE by remark 2, as n(^)  R ()  n. In particular, consider the sale strategy
^ = ((v   c)=c; (p   c)=(v   c); f()  ). The prots of such a sale strategy ^ satisfy the condition
(i), since
(^) =

1  
1  {

c{ =

1  
1  f() 

(p   c) (f()  )  f() ()  (),
where the rst inequality follows by f()   d (p ) (which must hold as sf() = 0, by df()(pf()) >
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0) and where the rest follows trivially from previous arguments. To establish condition (ii) instead,
observe that  () = 0(^) = (1   )(p   c), as no consumer has units stored in such periods.
Moreover, as  2 arg maxz2D(p) f(z)z (), it must be that (^)   (), since  () is a weighted
average of numbers smaller than f() (). This immediately implies that
R0(^) =
(^)
0(^)
  ()
 ()
= R ()  n.
Moreover, observe that 1(^) = 0 implies R1(^) = 1. Thus the result obtains, as n(^) =
mint0Rt(^) = R0(^)  n su¢ ces to establish that strategy ^ is SPE.
Proof Proposition 7. If S = 1, deviation prots in any period without sales are equal to zero.
Thus, no rm ever whishes to deviate in such periods (i.e. R1() = 1 if  2 E). Moreover, notice
that in this scenario:
R0() =
{
1  {
Hence, any two strategies in E with the same sale frequency are equally stable, provided that both
satisfy the storage constraint,   ({). Because R0() is increasing in {, the stability n() of
a sale strategy increases with {. To derive the trade-o¤ then observe, for any sale frequency {,
setting  = ({) and  =  maximizes prots with no consequences on stability. Thus, the trade-o¤
characterized in the proposition must hold, since n() increases in { while { = 0 (; ({);{)
decreases in { since
@0(; ({);{)
@{
=
c(1  )
(1  {)2

({ 1(1 + )  1)(1  {) + { 1((1 + )  ) log x 
 c(1  )
(1  {)2

({ 1(1 + )  1)  { 1((1 + )  ) (1  {) =  c(1  )2
(1  {) < 0
where the inequality holds as log x  x   1, and the rest is simple algebra.
Proof Proposition 8. To prove the claim it su¢ ces to show that  is more stable than any other
strategy in E . Consider any other strategy  = (; ;{) 2 S. First let us establish that if  2 E ,
then the sale strategy ({) = (;min f({); ({)g ;{) also belongs to E and is more stable than .
Note that:
({)  0
S{ + 0
 { 1

1 +
1


  1

 ({)
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where the rst inequality holds since  2 E , and the second since   . Moreover,
min f({); ({)g 2 [({); ({)]
since ({)  ({), as R1() < 1=(1  ) < R0() for any  < ({). Thus, ({) 2 E . To prove that
({) is more stable than , rst note that the markup  does not a¤ect mint0Rt() and increases
({), which in turn implies that setting  to its upper-bound cannot reduce the stability. Then
note that mint0Rt(;{) is single peaked in  2 [0; 1], since R0(;{) decreases in , since R1(;{)
increases in , and since R0(0;{) > R1(0;{) (see web-appendix for detail). Also notice that the
peak mint0Rt(;{) with respect to  is achieved exactly at  = ({). Thus, if ({)  ({), no
strategy with the same cycle length can be more stable than ({). If however, ({) > ({), the
most stable strategy must satisfy  = ({), since mint0Rt(;{) increases in  for  < ({).
Next observe that by the implicit function theorem we get that:
0({) =  R1{  R0{
R1  R0  0
Note that the denominator is trivially positive (see web-appendix), and that the numerator is negative
since at  = ({):
R0{  R1{ = 1
1  {

S

1  { 1 
0

+
{ 1 log 
1  {

0

  1


({)
  1

 0
where the rst term is positive since ({)  0={ 1, and where the second term is positive since
({)  min f({); 0g (see web-appendix for details). Hence, since 0({) < 0, there exists a unique
value { such that ({) = ({).
Let f({) = (({)=({))   1. Note that for a sale strategy to be more stable than a strategy
without sales it must be that f({)  0. Furthermore:
@
@{
R1(({);{) =
{ 1
1  {

f 0({) +
log 
1  { f({)

 
{ 1
1  {

f 0({)  1  
1  { f({)


 
{ 1
(1  {){ [{f
0({)  f({)]  0
where the rst inequality holds since log      1, and the second since 1   {  { (1  ). The
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third inequality instead, holds since:
{f 0({)  f({) = 1
({)

{0({)  {
0({)({)
({)
  ({) + ({)

=
=
1
({)

1 +
1


log {
 
{ 1

+ ({)
 
1  { 1 
 1
({)

1 +
1


({   1){ 1 + ({)  1  { 1 
 1
({)

1 +
1


(({)  { 1)  1  { 1 < 0
where the rst inequality holds, since log {  {   1, where the second holds trivially, and where
the last inequality holds since ({)  ({) is equivalent to:
{ 1  ({) + + 1

(1  ({)) > ({)
The last few observations together established that if ({)  ({) for some {, then increasing the
cycle length would only reduce the stability of the sale strategy ({). In turn this establishes that
setting { > { cannot improve stability.
Finally, note that, if { exits, no strategy with period { < { can be more stable than (; ({); {)
by denition of {. Thus, the most stable sale strategy will be either (; ({); {) or (; ({); {)
depending on the relative stability of the two.
The observation about prots follows trivially, since changing  and { would necessarily reduce
stability by construction of  and because  = v c
c
raises the highest prot and cannot lower
stability.
Proof Proposition 9. By the properties of the prot function discussed in the web-appendix,
prots at time 0 increase in , , and {. Thus, the most protable strategy in E with a cycle of
length { must trivially satisfy  = v c
c
and  = ({), since { 1

1 + 1


  1

increases in . Thus,
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the result follows immediately since { is selected by denition so to maximize prots in E and since:
@0(; ({);{)
@{
= 0
c(1  )2{ 1(1 + )
(1  {)2 log  +
S
c(1  )
(1  {)2

({ 1(1 + )  1)(1  {) + { 1((1 + )  ) log x 
 S c(1  )
(1  {)2

({ 1(1 + )  1)(1  {) + { 1((1 + )  ) log x 
  S c(1  )
2
(1  {) < 0
where the second inequality holds as log x  x   1, and the rest is simple algebra.
Proof Proposition 10. First note that if  > + no strategy in E is more protable than +.
Thus, no such prot level can be sustained by a sale strategy belonging to E . If so, the most stable
strategy is one without sales. However, all strategies in N are equally stable by proposition (7) and
thus, N() = 1
1  for any such strategy.
Then suppose that    and consider any strategy (; ; 2) with prots . Note that   
implies that either    or   . Also note that a di¤erent strategy (0; ; 2) exists which raises
exactly the same prots, since any prot level    can be obtained by picking 0 2 (0; ]. Thus,
observe that strategy (0; ; 2) is equally stable to strategy  = (; ; 2) and thus more stable
than (; ; 2).
Finally consider the case in which  2 (;+]. Note that for this to be the case it must be that
 < +, which in turn requires
 = (2) < (2) = +
Note that setting  =  is always optimal for both prots and stability. Thus, for any prot level
 2 (;+] a corresponding sales discount exists () 2 (; +] which sustains prot level .
Such a discount is found by solving the following equality with respect to ,
 =

0

1 + 
+ (2  0) 1
1 + 

c ) () = 1
2  0


v   c (1 + )  0

.
The value of N() in such interval can then be found by computing
N() = R0(
; (); 2) =
1
1  

()c
=
1
1  
(2  0) 
(1 + )   0 (v   c)
which establishes the desired result.
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Proof Proposition 11. First note when  2 (+;m] the sign of all the derivatives of N() =
1=(1   ) is trivial. Next, consider the case in which  2 (;+]. Note that within such interval
 2 (; +] and:
dN()
d0
=
1
1  
[2 (v   c)  (1 + ) ] 
((1 + )   0 (v   c))2
> 0 , 2 (v   c) > (1 + ) 
dN()
d
=
1
(1  )2

(2  0) [2 (  0 (v   c)) + 0 (v   c)] 
((1 + )   0 (v   c))2

> 0
dN()
dv
=  dN()
dc
=
1
1  
(2  0)0
((1 + )   0 (v   c))2
> 0
The second inequality holds, since  >  (v   c) and  > 0 together imply  > 0 (v   c) (where
the rst condition holds since 0 > 0 for the strategy to belong to E , and where the second condition
holds since  >  and since the only positive root of (2) satises  > 0, as explained in the
web-appendix).
Before we proceed nal scenario  2 (0;], let us prove all the remaining results. First, observe
that d(2)=dv = d(2)=dc = 0, since both R0 and R1 are independent of values and costs (see
web-appendix). Further note that by the implicit function theorem applied to the map (2):
 =
d(2)
d
=  R1  R0
R1  R0 =  
(1  0)0
 [2(2  0)   (1  0)0]
 =
d(2)
d0
=  R1  R0
R1  R0 =
( + 1) + 20(   )
[2(2  0)   (1  0)0]
Moreover, note that d(2)=d < 0, since 2(2  0) > (1  0)0 by denition of ; and that in
the only relevant scenario (i.e. (2) > (2)) d(2)=d0 > 0, since  > (2) > (2) = . Also, note
that R1 > 0, R0 < 0, R1 < 0 and R0 < 0. The sign of the derivatives of the map (2) follow
trivially from its denition.
Then note that + and its derivatives with respect to the relevant parameters satisfy:
+ =
0
1 + 
(v   c) + 2  0
1 + 
(v   c)
d+
d
=
2v + 2(1  0)c
(1 + )2
> 0 &
d+
d0
=
c (1  )
1 + 
> 0
d+
dv
=
2
1 + 
> 0 &
d+
dc
=  2  0(1  )
1 + 
< 0
To compute the derivatives of , consider the case in which (2) > (2). Or else,  and + and
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their respective derivatives would coincide. If so:
 =

0
1 + 
+
2  0
1 + 
(2)

(v   c)
d
d
=
1
(1 + )2

0   (2  0)(2) + (2  0) (1 + ) d(2)
d

(v   c) < 0
d
d0
=

   (2)
1 + 
+
2  0
1 + 
d(2)
d0

(v   c) > 0
d
dv
=  d

dc
=

0
1 + 
+
2  0
1 + 
(2)

> 0
where the rst inequality holds since E 6= ; implies 0  (2  0)(2)  0, and the second inequality
holds since (2) > (2) implies  > (2). At last, consider the case in which  2 (0;]. Suppose
that  6= +. If so, (2) > (2) and therefore:
dN()
d
=
1
(1  )2 [R0 + (1  ) [R0 +R0]] > 0 (5)
dN()
d0
=
1
1   [R0 +R0] < 0 (6)
dN()
dv
=
dN()
dc
= 0 (7)
where (7) holds trivially, where (5) is positive because R0 > 0 and because
R0 + (1  )R0 = 0

+
2
(1 + )2
h
(2  0)  0

i
> 0,
and where (6) is negative since
R0 +R0 =
R1R0  R0R1
R1  R0 =  
1
R1  R0

0 (1 + )
2 [0 +  (2  0)] < 0,
Finally, consider the case in which  2 (0;] and  = +. If so, (2)  (2) and
dN()
d
=
1 
1  22

2 +
2  0
0

(1 + 2)+ (1  2)

> 0
dN()
d0
=   
1  2
2
20
< 0
dN()
dv
=

1  2
2  0
0
v > 0 &
dN()
dc
=

1  2
2  0
0
c < 0.
which concludes the proof.
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Proof Proposition 12. Assume that the discount factor  satises
 >
1 + 0
(2 0) 
1 + 0
. (8)
This implies that (2   0) > 1. To establish (1) consider any strategy  = (; 1;{) 2 N and
consider the strategy  = (n; 1;{) 2 N where
n =
(2  0)(1  )
(2  0)   1 .
Condition 8 implies that n > 0. If   n (that is if ()  n), then (2   0)^()   and
n() = 1
1  . Alternatively, if  > 
n (that is if () > n) and (2  0)^() >  and
n() =
1
1  

(2  0)[(1 + )  1] .
These observation then immediately yield the result (1) since () = c.
To establish (2) consider any strategy  = (; ; 2) 2 C and recall that
() =
(2  0) + 0
1 + 
c.
Hence, prots increase both in  and in  provided that the storage constraint is satised   (2).
Provided that (1 + )  1 > 0, simple algebra also establishes that
[0 + (2  0)]
(2  0) 
[0 + (2  0)]
(1 + )  1 .
Therefore, the incentives to deviate in periods of sales exceed those in periods without sales if the
deviation entails selling to players with units already stored. The following simplication obtains
n() =
1
1  2 min

[0 + (2  0)]
(2  0) ;
[0 + (2  0)]
0

.
If  < 0=(2   0), the rst term in the minimum exceeds the second. The converse holds if
 > 0=(2   0), and the two terms coincide whenever  = 0=(2   0). Thus, any strategy
~ = (; 0=(2  0); 2) satises n(~) = 11  and (~) = 0c. Increasing the markup  to its upper-
bound  increases prots with no e¤ect on stability. Moreover, when  = , the strategy satises
the storage constraint, because (1 + ) >

1 + 0
2 0 

by 8. Any lower prot level can also be
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sustained by strategies with a lower regular markup  and the same discount 0=(2  0), provided
that consumers are su¢ ciently patient, so that 0=(2   0)  (2). To conclude the proof of part
(2) observe that whenever  > 0=(2  0)
n() =
1
1  2

0 + (2  0)
(2  0)

=
1
1  

()
(1 + )()  0c

,
where the equality obtains by denition of (). Moreover, since increasing the markup  to its
upper-bound  increases prots with no e¤ect on stability, we obtain the desired result,
Ns() =
1
1  


(1 + )  0(v   c)

for any   s.
Clearly  cannot exceed + or else the storage constraint would not be satised. Moreover, + > s
is equivalent to
 >
1
1 + 2 20
2 0 
which holds always by condition 8.
To establish (3) observe that the largest prot at which Nn() = 11  , amounts to 
n. Instead,
the largest prot at which Ns() = 11  amounts to 
s. Moreover, condition 8 is equivalent to
(2  0)(1  )
(2  0)   1 c < 0(v   c),
and therefore Ns() > Nn(), whenever  2 (n;s]. However, strategies in C remain more stable
than strategies in N until some threshold  > s. In particular, if   denotes the unique root to
the equation Ns( ) = Nn( ), we have that  = minf+; g.
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